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There is a growing interest in cross-border medical care and its comparative advantages. In addition, medical care can 
be defined as a local assurance good. Little research is being carried out in this field. This paper discusses the 
individual considerations for medical treatment offered at home and abroad within a micro-economical framework. 
Specific assumptions as mistrust, monetary and non-monetary transaction-costs, a price and cost gradient, illness 
severity as well as a lump-sum insurance are discussed. We show that a demand abroad can be utility maximizing, 
however, only second best. There are inefficiencies in the dimensions of ex-post demand and income risk either on the 
side of gross-income or of costs. Furthermore, the foreign demand is restricted for low health stages driven by mistrust 
and restrictions in quality. Higher stages are more capable if fixed costs are low. To demand abroad the marginal 
treatment costs abroad must fall short of a threshold level. Finally, an out-of-pocket payment can reduce the moral 
hazard when treatment takes place abroad. 
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This paper provides a contribution to the debate about cross-border medical care and
patient migration. Little is happening in this ﬁeld, although this subject has become
more interesting recently in, both, practice and theory. Smith (2008) makes this subject
into one of the most important the health economists will be faced with in the future.
The political discussion about the beneﬁts of cross-border care and a small number of
scientiﬁc contributions have been delivered for almost a decade. However, the economic
literature does not provide an acceptable framework for a detailed discussion with accurate
results about the eﬀectiveness of cross-border demand and its potential. Hence, this paper
addresses the issue of how cross-border medical demand works and what the impact of
speciﬁc determinants is in respect to the eﬃciency of demand.
The process of internationalization has advanced widely to almost all economic sec-
tors. Since 1995, when the General Agreement on Trade in Services was signed by the
WTO, also the health care sector came into focus as a potential globalizing service sector
(Adlung and Carzaniga (2001), Chanda (2002)). However, measured on the total ser-
vice trade and health care expenditures, the activities of patient migration in diﬀerent
OECD countries are low and without a cognizable trend (Waeger (2007)). Normally, the
national governments deny their support and the portability of insurance coverage for
tradable medical services (Mattoo and Rathindran (2006)). Even within supranational
systems such as the European Union, an agreement has not taken place contrary to the
general principle of free factor mobility and trade in goods and services. Patients and
insurers are sceptical regarding the utility gain and the potential for cost-savings.1
However, world-wide, some dynamics have developed in the ﬁeld of patient migration,
also called health tourism. Countries like Thailand, Malaysia and India have developed
into global destinations for medical care (Mattoo and Rathindran (2005)). From an eco-
nomical perspective, the motivation for this demand is of importance and can be separated
into a price and a quality gradient. The focus shall be on the price gradient, which should
mainly be valid for patients from more highly developed countries. Busse et al. (2008)
compare costs for speciﬁc treatments among a number of countries in the EU and show
a strong variance among them caused by diﬀerences in wages and the technologies used.2
Mattoo and Rathindran (2005) show price diﬀerences between the United States and
countries of South East Asia up to a factor of ten for relatively standardised and tradable
medical services of comparable quality.3 They estimate a savings potential of 1.4 Billion
$US if 10% of concerned patients were to demand relevant treatment abroad. Measured
on the total expenditures of almost 2 trillion US$ (Smith et al. (2006)), this ﬁgure appears
small. However, considering the degree of out-of-pocket payments in the United States
1Obermaier (2009) also identiﬁes institutional and political barriers in medical trade between Austria
and Hungary. He also estimates a potential for trade, which currently is a negligible phenomenon,
however, with a possible potential for the future.
2Fujisawa and Lafortune (2008) analysed the wages of general practitioners and specialists in 14 OECD
countries. Measured in purchasing power parities, there exists a wide range and variance, especially for
specialists. The highest wages are paid in the US and The Netherlands, the lowest in Eastern Europe
(Hungary and the Czech Republic) with a diﬀerence of almost 200T $US.
3For example, a skin lesion excision has an inpatient price in US of 6,240 $US. The average of the
three lowest foreign prices is 812 $US, in which the travel cost are included.
2and the chronic cost pressures in a number of other countries, price gradients could be
useful instruments in the debate about options for making health systems more eﬃcient.
Beside an existing quality and price gradient, the literature discusses transaction-costs
as a further determinant for cross-border demand, which shall also be taken into account
in this paper whereby these costs will be separated into monetary and non-monetary as
well as variable and ﬁxed costs.4 Furthermore, this paper identiﬁes the severity of illness
as an additional determinant. Another central component is trust or better mistrust over
the provided quality abroad. Healthcare provisions can be deﬁned as a local assurance
good derived from the basic characteristics of medical goods, from trust as a general de-
terminant of economic transactions as well as the role of trust within trade relations. A
change in the local place of medical provisions can generate a subjective mistrust about
the foreign provider without any objective evidence.
The individual asks for a lump-sum insurance coverage that pays attention to a med-
ical provision at home or abroad. Then, the objective of this paper is to show how
cross-border demand changes the results of a pure home treatment solution in terms of
the dimensions ex-post demand and income-risk. Afterwards, the medical demand abroad
is analyzed for a utility-maximizing option.
Three cases can be constructed: First, provision at home; second, provision abroad with
mistrust as a preference (intrinsic); and third, provision abroad with an inﬂuenceable
mistrust (pragmatic). The results can be summarized as follows. In a case of intrinsic
mistrust, the ex-post demand and income risk are not distorted compared to the solution
at home as long as the maximum possible medical demand is not achieved abroad. If
mistrust is extended beyond an intrinsic level (pragmatic) and transaction-costs as well
as restricted quality are added, a demand bias is produced based on a lowering of demand
and a subjective adjustment of quality. Furthermore, the non-compensatable transaction
costs and a restricted quality abroad connected with a subjective adjustment of quality
do not allow an equalization of net-incomes and utility, which induces an income-risk
either on the side of gross-income or on the side of costs. In detail, mistrust generates an
adjustment of marginal cost upwards in terms of higher average cost per eﬀective qual-
ity unit whereby a diﬀerentiation between a perceived and a factual uncertainty must
be attended to. The produced demand bias induces ineﬃciency costs of mistrust. The
marginal treatment costs abroad must fall short of a threshold level to compensate for
these eﬀects and to achieve an improvement of expected utility. Based on a restricted
quality and mistrust, diseases with a high degree of severity are unsuitable for a foreign
provision despite increasing cost-saving potential. An extension of the available quality
abroad above the level at home dampens this restriction. Higher levels of health are more
4There is a broad literature about hospital choice and its general determinants. Adams and Porell
(1995) deliver a review article about a broad number of determinants. For a more detailed analysis of
speciﬁc determinants see also McGuirk and Porell (1984), Garnick et al. (1989), Burns and Wholey
(1989), Luft et al. (1990), Luft and Phibbs (1995). For the speciﬁc context of cross-border care within
the EU see e.g. Calnan et al. (1997), Starmans et al. (1997), France (1997), Crivelli (1998), Crivelli and
Zweifel (1998). The determinants shown in these papers are partially implemented or summarized in this
paper. Not all determinants are included, especially the detailed assumptions about the physician.
3suitable, however, ﬁxed transaction-costs must receive attention.
Altogether, a second best solution at its best is possible abroad compared to a potential
ﬁrst best solution under purely intrinsic mistrust. Under pragmatic mistrust a third best
solution is also possible when utility decreases below the level at home. In addition,
a mixed insurance tariﬀ is thinkable also in a case where no insurance is provided for
foreign treatment whereby health stages are separated regarding severity and location of
treatment which maximizes the expected utility.
At last, a ﬁxed co-payment insurance is discussed where the insurance wants to restrict
the foreign demand. An adjustment of the foreign co-payment allows a reduction in moral
hazard and a implementation of cost savings which, however, must be shared with the
patient. Transaction-costs must be compensated by an increasing savings potential. A
full insurance at home reduces but not eliminates the incentive to demand abroad due to
a reduced sensitivity over foreign costs. However, a gain of gross-income is impossible. If
there is no insurance coverage, the critical level of marginal and ﬁxed costs are of interest
to fulﬁll the necessary condition of utility for the patient.
The results are a starting point for a discussion in health politics. The cost-advantage
of the foreign country cannot be used in its total amount because of given ineﬃciencies.
Furthermore, it must be asked in which amount the cross-border supply can remain un-
changed when it is faced with ineﬃciency sources, which probably have a limited potential
to be reduced below a prohibitive level. For example, Hirsch (1989) discussed the poor-
tradability-hypothesis, which means a restriction of a trade based on transaction-costs
and the necessity of a decentralized provision of e.g. the medical supply.
There are only a few contributions in the theoretical literature in the context of cross-
border supply. Mattoo and Rathindran (2005) discuss the impact of an insurance for
treatments abroad under consideration of an ex-post moral hazard but without paying
attention to the speciﬁc characteristics of a demand abroad. Seninger (2000) analyzes the-
oretical and identiﬁes empirical diﬀerences in spatial information and transaction costs
between certain U.S. federal states as determinants for hospital choice. Crivelli (1998) dis-
cusses patient migration between cantons in Switzerland, and Crivelli and Zweifel (1998)
do so in a principal-agent framework for the EU. However, the main focus is on physician
behaviour and the procedure of approval caused by the insurance for treatment abroad.
As a theoretical basis, Zeckhauser (1970), Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Gaynor
et al. (2001) deal with the insurance demand and the eﬃciency of the demand. Breyer
et al. (1997) provide an excellent overview of the theory which is the foundation for the
discussion of eﬀectiveness of ex-post demand and insurance in this paper.
The paper is structured as follows: In the second chapter, the basic structure and as-
sumptions of the model are described. Afterwards, in chapters three to ﬁve, the demands
at home and abroad according to eﬃciency impacts as well as the condition for a utility
improvement abroad are discussed. Chapter six presents a short discussion of the ex-post
medical demand in a framework of a co-payment insurance. Chapter seven presents a
short discussion of the results and the conclusion.
42 The model
The individual is faced with an uncertain event of a tradable illness, which means an
illness without acute perilous character. It can be treated in two hospitals: 1. at home
(h) or 2. abroad (f).
2.1 Quality, Cost and Utility
The treatment quality can be characterized as follows. The individual has a health status
Hs with 0  Hs   H, with  H as maximal health. Each Hs occurs with a probability s.
 Hs can be deﬁned as a status after medical treatment was undertaken:
 Hs = Hs + qs (1)
For simpliﬁcation, the health status has the form of an investment good whereby Ysi is
the gross-income:
Ysi = Ysi(Hs + qsi) with i = h;f ; Y
0
i > 0 ; Y
00
i < 0 (2)
qs represents the demanded quality with a maximum amount of  qs to achieve the
maximum  H. Hence, every health status has another range of treatment quality, which
is demandable and depends on the severity of the illness. E. g. for an ordinary inﬂuenza,
a lower range of medical instruments exists compared to a diﬃcult cardiac-surgery.5 It
can be explained by an operation. There exist diﬀerent techniques such as the usual gash
with a scalpel, keyhole surgery or high frequency surgery. Every method results in a
speciﬁc success, which diﬀers in its level of quality for the patient, e. g. in the duration
of aftercare, infections, or a large cicatrice, which generates psychological problems.
To simplify, the maximum level of medical quality for the most diﬃcult condition
Hs = 0 is  H =  q. Both countries can be diﬀerentiated by this quality level. The home
country can provide this maximum level  qh =  H, therefore, any illness can be returned to
 H. However, the foreign country can only provide a maximum quality level of qmax
f =   qh
with 0 <   1. Therefore, health levels exist with Hs <  q   qmax
f which cannot be
returned to  H, completely. By this diﬀerence is meant that especially the most modern
technologies are unavailable or there is a lack of experience with them. Hence, the foreign
medical provisions are less developed than those in the home country.6
The basic cost function for providing quality is linear in quality:




The price oﬀered by a hospital in both countries is equal to the cost. The foreign country
has a cost advantage with 
  1. The individual can insure the treatment costs with a
5It is not possible to oﬀer a quality level higher than  qs for a speciﬁc health status Hs because of its
ineﬃcacy. Hence, smaller levels of  qs are not a subset of higher  qs’s.
6This assumption will be relaxed in a later part of this paper.
5lump sum refund. The insurance objective is the maximization of the patient’s expected





Ri is the insurance rate and Asi the reimbursement. Finally, the individual’s beneﬁts are
achieved only by her net-income ysi in a given status with Csi as the total costs.
ysi = Ysi(Hs + qsi)   Ri   Csi + Asi with U(ysi)
0 > 0 ; U(ysi)
00 < 0 (6)
2.2 Information, trust and trade in medical services
Information
The health status Hs is observable in the context of a lump-sum insurance. The patient
is fully informed about the treatment quality oﬀered by a hospital at home and abroad.
Therefore, the ex-post quality demand takes place under certainty and the individual
receives the quality which is demanded. Therefore, a strategic behaviour of the supply
side or any kind of an exogenous shock by the choice of quality are excluded in the model.
The exclusion of risk also means that the providers at home and abroad behave as perfect
agents to maximize patient utility.
However, there is one important diﬀerence to the home country. The individual mis-
trusts the provided quality abroad. Due to the importance of trust, for the further discus-
sion we want to motivate this point based on its extraordinary but particular importance
in the general economic discussion.
Trust in economic relations
There is a growing literature discussing trust and its determinants and impact on eco-
nomical transactions. Arrow (1972) already described trust as an essential element of
the economic’s operativeness. Coleman (1990) deﬁned trust as a principal’s voluntary
transfer of resources to an agent in expectation of a speciﬁc payback whereby a formal
contract does not exist. Trust also plays a critical role in the intensively discussed ﬁeld
of social capital. This form of capital is seen as a main determinant for the performance
of institutions and therefore the economical prosperity on a micro- and macro-level based
on overcoming imperfect information within an informal environment of communities
(Fukuyama (1995), La Porta et al. (1997)).
But how can trust be described in more detail from an economical perspective? Typ-
ically, trust is connected to a risk about the agent’s behaviour. However, as could be
shown in diﬀerent experiments, trust can be separated from the common known risk of a
lottery. It is primarily connected to an interpersonal relationship to another human being
and represents an additional risk beside a natural risk according to a lottery.7
7E. g. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) show that a principal reduces his investment activities when a
game changes from a pure lottery with a natural risk to a principal agent relationship with an identical
expected revenue. Thus, the authors infer another risk, namely trust, which is purely connected to an
interpersonal relationship to the agent’s behaviour as a human actor and exists beside the preference for
risk aversion. In addition, Eckel and Wilson (2004) cannot aﬃrm a straight connection between a natural
6Experiments based on game theoretical theories as prisoners dilemma, reciprocity and
repeated games give us an insight into the important drivers of trust. In particular, ex-
perience gained in history within a speciﬁc relationship and the possibility to develop
reputation as an agent is described as essential institutional environments to develop the
trusting behaviour of the principal and the trustworthiness of the agent (Glaeser et al.
(2000), Bohnet and Huck (2004)).8 Other determinants are religious (La Porta et al.
(1997)) and cultural similarities (Greif (1993), Fukuyama (1995), Rauch (1999), Glaeser
et al. (2000)), historical ties (Greif (1993), Rauch (1999)) as well as associated persons
(Buchan and Croson (2004)). Furthermore, network structures within organizations or
speciﬁc coalitions with a speciﬁc cultural background can be of importance (Greif (1993),
La Porta et al. (1997), Rauch (1999), Rauch and Trindade (2002)). These institutional
arrangements can reduce mistrust and extend investment activities (see also Knack and
Keefer (1997)).
Trust and medical care
Medical services are generally accepted as reputation or assurance goods as Pauly (1988)
already described. This is based on speciﬁc characteristics of medical demand, in particu-
lar the information asymmetry between the expert physician and the laymen patient, the
exceptional circumstances in which the medical demand of a sick individual takes place
and the small-sized sample of demand (Arrow (1963)). Gaining experience is necessary
within an interpersonal patient-physician relationship (PPR) to generate trust.
A more speciﬁc deﬁnition of trust within a PPR is an interpersonal relationship in
which a potential vulnerability of a sick individual is not exploited by the physician given
the asymmetric relationship (Hall et al. (2001), Abelson et al. (2008)). This is also based
on an ethical dimension (Maynard and Bloor (2003)). Goudge and Gilson (2005) give an
overview about the important characteristics of this speciﬁc form of trust. The patient’s
belief in trust is more focussed on the motivation and the intention the physician acts
on. Hence, trust depends on the aggregated characteristics of the provider connected to
his integrity. As concrete dimensions, the technical competence, ability to communicate,
ﬁdelity, conﬁdentiality, and the anxiety of well-being are stated. Thus, trust in medical
care has a higher degree of emotionality compared to other goods and services (Mechanic
(1998), Hall et al. (2001), Goudge and Gilson (2005)).9
The former discussion of trust in general and, more speciﬁcally, in health care results
in a deﬁnition of a trusty PPR based on experience with a speciﬁc medical provider and
the reputation this provider could assemble. Furthermore, the relation is not purely based
on a risk produced by potentially opportunistic behaviour by the physician as an agent
but on more fundamental and emotional trust than an interpersonal tie, which also holds
risk and trust due to an experiment in which participants change their strategies within a repeated game
despite an unchanged basical attitude to risk.
8Bohnet and Huck (2004) identify a strong impact of experiences when the relationship between agent
and principal has a form of a partnership and not only of an anonymous reputation system.
9Hall et al. (2001) diﬀer between an intrinsic and an instrumental form of trust. The former is
applied to the PPR and its inherent characteristics, the substantial sense of a trustworthy and sensitive
interpersonal relation. The latter is more pragmatic and is related to a concrete PPR connected to a
speciﬁc medical demand. It is also related to the patient’s compliance to abide with a physician and
maybe to recommend him to other individuals within a health care system.
7up beside a concrete case of illness and generated medical demand (Hall et al. (2001)).
Trust, trade and medical demand
In a very recent paper, Guiso et al. (2009) discuss the impact of trust on trade. They
ﬁnd that according to trading partners, trust depends on the speciﬁc bilateral country’s
relationships. Furthermore, the highest trust can be found according to one’s fellow coun-
trymen. These ﬁndings are based on stereotypes generated by cultural characteristics,
available information through the media, one’s common history, and religious similarities.
The more similar countries are the higher trust is pronounced in terms of trade relations.
They also ﬁnd an increasing role of trust for highly diﬀerentiated goods.10 The character-
istics of trust connected to a medical demand outside the local place of residence precede
the deﬁnition of medical provision as a local assurance good. Experience with a speciﬁc
provider and also reputation of a speciﬁc provider is usually gained locally. Mostly, in-
dividuals are used to ask for care locally within a small group of providers as general
practitioners, specialists, and hospitals. Thiede (2005) uses the term of overlapping life
worlds (derived from Habermas’s communication theory), which means that an increasing
degree of congruency of diﬀerent life worlds increases information in their trustworthiness.
Hence, the habit of using a speciﬁc health care system makes it a part of the individual’s
life world, which is a broader deﬁnition of a trusty relationship. In this deﬁnition not
only an interpersonal PPR but also the health care system itself plays a role for trust.
Then, trust is also inﬂuenced by a general attitude according to the health care system
in which the patient asks for care.11 Finally, for trade in medical services trust plays an
outstanding role. Due to the character of a local assurance good, trust decreases in a case
in which a potential medical demand is directed towards a provider abroad or the familiar
life world of the patient.12
Trust is implemented as  with  < 1 with:
 Hsi = Hs + iqsi (7)
This function describes  as a subjective perceived productivity downgrade below the
actual level abroad. h = 1 which means there is no downgrade at home. An important
assumption is that  does not represent a probability of a failed medical quality due
to an actual opportunistic behaviour of the foreign provider. Instead, it stands for a
general and subjective downgrade of the capacity the foreign provider can deliver despite
the fact that the patient actually might know something about an objective certainty of
10Therewith they also approve of Rauch (1999) who postulates speciﬁc searching costs for highly dif-
ferentiated goods, which make an informal and trusty network structure necessary. Greif (1993) discusses
historical trade networks in the Mediterranean area which were based on informal relations and therefore
trust. Economic losses are also identiﬁed based on a reduced trade outside these networks.
11There exists some literature about trust in medical institutions which is quite diﬀerent to the trust
in a PPR and describes a bi-directional impact of trust between interpersonal and institutional relations
(Mechanic (1998), Hall et al. (2002), Rowe (2006), Schee et al. (2007), Abelson et al. (2008)).
12Seninger (2000) makes the choice of hospitals between U.S. federal states dependent on the spatial
availability of information which diﬀers between the state of origin and the target state. Finally, this
could be translated into diﬀerences in information about the general system or diﬀerences in trust.
8quality.13 This is related to the described fact that the PPR is more emotional and not
only related to a speciﬁc demand but to a familiar relationship which cannot be provided
by a foreign physician at the beginning. The assumption of the physician as a perfect
agent gives trust an emotional dimension, which is based less on calculations of risk.14
Hence,  just bundles the considerations made above in a very simple approach, and a
factual uncertainty about the success of a treatment is excluded.15
Furthermore, trust shall be separated into: a) intrinsic trust   and b) pragmatic trust
 <  . Both diﬀer in their rationality. The intrinsic mistrust 1    can actually be hardly
changed externally and cannot bet totally eliminated. This parameter represents a more
natural mistrust and is a preference-inherent variable.16 As described above, medical
goods and services are often allegorized as very sensitive goods when the habitual envi-
ronment of medical provision changes, which is particulary the case in foreign treatment.
However, the pragmatic mistrust 1    > 1     can be changed by external mea-
sures more eﬀectively and is basically connected to general characteristics of the foreign
health care system which generates a speciﬁc attitude regarding the system.17 Schee et
al. (2007) delineate this kind of trust partially as a public attitude produced by diﬀerent
kinds of experience and public exposure in the media.18 Therefore, it can depend on the
country itself, its characteristics connected to a diﬀerent image of quality.19 In addition,
networks such as cross-border cooperations of health care providers and political agree-
ments can communicate a higher degree of trust in the foreign system. Not least, one’s
own experience, gained from foreign medical provisions can inﬂuence mistrust derived
from a speciﬁc PPR abroad. Altogether, the pragmetic mistrust can be interpreted as
13To generate demand information must be available which is not free. These costs are not implemented
in  but in provider related transaction-costs presented below.
14Hall et al. (2001) draw the picture that an individual could prefer a less skilled physician compared
to a highly skilled one as long as the former is more committed to the well-being of the individual.
15Guiso et al. (2009) use a similar approach to implement mistrust in a decision about a foreign direct
investment. However, beside a subjective mistrust about the trustworthiness of the foreign partner they
also assume an objective probability of misinvestment. A decreasing trust level reduces the opportunity
for investment and generates ﬁrst-order losses.
16Fehr (2008) gives the example of a statement that ’someone cannot be careful enough’ which rather
represents a general preference than a speciﬁc behaviour.
17In general, a speciﬁc attitude also exists in terms of higher developed systems (e. g. in U.S. mistrust
rises due to managed care, cost pressure, and restricted freedom of choice (Mechanic (1998))). This image
must not be better compared to a foreign system urgently. However, the general attitude according to a
trustier health care at home is assumed.
18As Fehr (2008) described, preferences are mostly exogenously ﬁxed long-term. This means that
preferences shape trust similar to the deﬁned intrinsic trust. Guiso et al. (2009) also say that trust can
take the form of a preference, e. g. the long term relations between French and British citizens and a
kind of congenital mistrust. But it is also endogenous in the sense that belief inﬂuences trust. This is
more compatible with an inﬂuenceable pragmatic trust.
19E. g. a higher maximum quality abroad could be connected to higher trust in this system (0() > 0).
The aﬃnity of countries is also relevant. E. g., regions like the western border of Germany to The Nether-
lands, Belgium and Luxembourg are similar in diﬀerent aspects of their language, traditions, historical
development, cultural, and religious similarities etc. which also inﬂuence the subjective assessment of
medical provision. Individuals could also associate low prices with a lower level of quality (0(
) > 0).
This point is quite eligible. Due to 
 determines the level of demand, a functional dependence between
mistrust and 
 would have an important inﬂuence on a treatment choice abroad. However, this shall not
be implemented into the discussion.
9non-rational because it is less preference-inherent and therefore problematic for eﬃciency
(similar to the problem Guiso et al. (2009) described).20 Due to the paper only wants to
focus on demand behaviour, measures to increase trust are negligible.
3 Provision at home as a benchmark
At ﬁrst, the benchmark is analyzed for a medical provision at home. This is presented
only brieﬂy due to its status of common knowledge. There are two important dimensions
to be analyzed: optimal quality demand and optimal insurance coverage. The following
utility- and expected utility function can be speciﬁed for the home country:





The following condition is maximized to obtain the optimal quality demand and refund












































sh = 0 (14)
Therefore, the condition for the optimal demand is (FOC (11)):
Y
0
sh = 1 (15)
Condition (15) says that the marginal product of medical demand must be equal to the
marginal costs of treatment (except for  H). Then, the same income Yh in every health
status is produced with an optimal demand q
sh, which delivers  H
s 8Hs.
The marginal utility is equal in every health status after treatment (FOC (12)) which
is fulﬁlled in a case in which the costs for q
sh are covered completely.
Thus, the standard conclusion for a lump-sum insurance is a demand along the
marginal costs linked with identical incomes in every health status based on full cov-
erage and, therefore, full elimination of the ex-post income risk.
20Of course, intrinsic and pragmatic mistrust are not irrespective of each other. An increase in prag-
matic trust regarding a speciﬁc country could inﬂuence the intrinsic trust positively. Hence, measures
to reduce the pragmatic mistrust also inﬂuence intrinsic mistrust which, however, cannot be eliminated
totally. However, this interdependence shall not be discussed.
104 Provision abroad
Let us now discuss the case of foreign treatment with the integration of the assumptions
explained above. Similar to (8) and (9), the patient’s utility function and the expected
utility for a treatment abroad are:
Usf(ysf) = Usf [Ysf(Hs + qf)   Rf   





Due to an adjusted quality qsf, the Ysf and ysf are also adjusted. The cost-function is
represented by (4). Under t(qsf), the diﬀerent kinds of transaction-costs are summarized:
t = T + ms(qsf) + ns(qsf) (18)
T are lump-sum when q
sf > 0, e. g. travel costs with T > 0. m describes monetary and
n non-monetary costs with m0
s(qsf);n0
s(qsf) > 0, ms(0) = ns(0) = 0, mmax
s ( qsf);nmax
s ( qsf).
A lower health level Hs makes a greater eﬀort m necessary e. g. through higher orga-
nizational eﬀort, the management of interfaces between ex-ante and ex-post provision,
and higher eﬀort in locating a speciﬁc provider.21 n as physical or mental pain is strictly
connected to a speciﬁc kind of illness and increases in its severity.22 23




























fs = 0 (20)
21As an empirical example, the position m arises through an added organizational eﬀort the insurance
has to make in the case when a patient demands home-based out-of network treatment (Obermaier
(2009)).
22m and n are explicitly separated from the impact of trust. Both kinds of costs are speciﬁcally
connected to a speciﬁc provider (m) and to an illness (n). Someone could argue that mistrust could also
be a part of non-monetary transaction-costs. Maybe this could be an alternative description. However,
the transformation of the production function is more plausible as will be seen below.
23An interpretation of tradable illnesses can be the following. Constant marginal costs are assumed
independent of illness severity. However, illnesses exist with an acute character e. g. an acute myocardial
infarct. Such a condition makes immediate treatment necessary for survival. Any attempt to demand
treatment abroad produces transaction-costs against inﬁnity. Hence, rising marginal costs of m and es-
pecially n make more sense. In contrast, for less severe conditions like a simple common cold, immediate
treatment is also necessary due to a general indisposition. A severe condition such as cancer or a bypass
operation could allow more time for planning or are connected with an indisposition as a usual circum-
stance for the patient. Then, decreasing marginal transaction-costs for severe conditions makes more
sense. In this paper, acute illnesses are excluded as not tradable. To keep the analysis simple, there is
no diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent levels of disease. Every illness level makes an identical contribution
to the marginal costs, which means that there are no disease-immanent attributes. In other words, only
illnesses that produce further costs outside the illness itself (m and n) are tradable. Trading itself does




























Again, the marginal revenue must be equal to the sum of the marginal costs consisting
of treatment costs and of monetary and non-monetary transaction-costs. To simplify, let
us assume a case in which 
 = 1 and t = 0 generalized later. Then, the marginal revenue
must rise for  < 1 to be equal to 1. The slope of the foreign production function is smaller
in every point of q than at home because each unit of demanded quality produces a lower
perceived extension of income than at home. Hence, the demand abroad is reduced with:
q
sh > q
sf 8s. Furthermore, q
sf determines cf(q
sf) as costs, which the patient and the
insurance pay for, respectively. However, based on mistrust, the quality implemented as
an input for income is only given with q
sf.
Let us denote the former case F. In a case  F in which mistrust is implemented as
a pure preference parameter (or maximum trust) and transaction costs shall accrue, the





 F can be described as the benchmark abroad. However, (24) also describes a reduced
demand compared to home for 
 = 1.
As in the case at home, the income Y 
sf is equal for all Hs. Condition (20) postulates
a constant marginal revenue and a income for all Hs. Asf can cover all monetary costs
arising from a treatment with A
sf = 
q
sf +T +ms. However, there are transaction-costs
ns which cannot be compensated by the insurance. Hence, it must be proved whether full






















s = ms + T + 
qs
(25)
Furthermore, we assume that it is optimal for the individual to insure the treatment
costs abroad. In a case in which full insurance is optimal A
s = ms +T +
qs takes place.
Then, (25) and (20) deliver:
U
0





sf(Ysf   R   ns) (26)
The right-hand side is the expected marginal utility over all s, and the left-hand
side the marginal utility for a speciﬁc s. Hence, (26) cannot be fulﬁlled for all s. The
corner solution for full insurance of monetary costs cannot be optimal in a case in which
12n0(q
sf) > 0. This result is based on a non-insureability of n which results in an impossible
equation of marginal utilities. Only in a case in which n0(q
sf) = 0, (26) can be fulﬁlled.
As a solution either an over-insurance or a deductible are oﬀered in theory to fulﬁll (26).
However, due to the non-monetary character of n and the diﬃculty to observe such costs
an implementation of an over-insurance or deductible is assumed as excluded.24 At this
point it must also be highlighted that Ysf is not necessarily equal for all s as claimed
in (23). This is based on an adjustment of the demanded quality upwards based on
 < 1. The adjustment must increase when the health stage decreases but is limited
in the maximum possible demand qmax
f . Hence, in a case in which this upper bound is
achieved Yf is not longer equal for all health stages in anticipation. This point is discussed
below in more detail. At this point, is important that an insureability of diﬀerences in
gross-income is also excluded. As a result we have full insurance of monetary costs to
reduce the gap between the net-incomes as much as possible but a remaining uncertainty.
In case  F with t = 0 a complete cost coverage with constant ex-post costs still remain.
Impacts of a foreign treatment option
What are the impacts of treatment abroad in detail? There are diﬀerent sources of
ineﬃciency which shall be discussed for both F and  F.
Mistrust
First, in the case of F mistrust produces a bias in the form of a reduced demand and
net-income below the level under full trust. However, not 1    but      is responsible
for an ineﬃciency. For   =  and t = 0 (case  F) mistrust only represents a speciﬁc
preference by the individual. Then, the demand itself (24) is eﬃcient. But as long as
    > 0 it is deﬁned as not preference-inherent but endogenous. An increase in eﬃciency
abroad can be possible through adequate measures.
Furthermore, under mistrust the perceived income Yf(  H) for  = 1 is not achievable
for F and  F. For a given illness indeed  qsf is possible to be provided abroad. Even if
this quality is demanded, the ex-ante adjusted quality is lower and therefore the adjusted
income as well (Ysf(Hs + qsf) < Ysh(Hs +  qsh) for  qsf =  qsh) (also valid for  ). Then, the
condition of equal ex-post health stages 8s is not longer fulﬁlled from an ex-ante point
of view. Although the individual would receive what s/he demands abroad ex-post in a
case in which  qsf is demanded, the subjective adjustment of quality produces a perceived
uncertainty which reduces the ex-ante utility. On the other side, a factual inequality of
gross-incomes arises for all demand levels below  qsf also based on the adjustment of the
real demand. However, this inequality is not in the mind of the patient. In addition,
based on the adjusted quality a decreasing health status reduces the ex-ante income due
to a decreasing lower bound Hs in Ysf(Hs+ qsf). In general, the lower the Hs the higher
the quality demand must be measured relative to a higher Hs due to a relative share of
 on q
sf and a constant marginal return Y 0
sf(H)8s to be achieved in the optimum. This
24For a detailed analysis of these elements in general see Breyer et al. (1997), ch. 6. They also discuss
administration costs which the insurance can shift to the insurant. However, in this paper transaction-
costs would also arise without insurance and are an inherent part of a foreign provision. Hence, it remains
optimal for the individual to cover these with a maximum amount.
13is intuitively clear due to which the degree of severity of N illness must have an impact
on the necessary demand because of a compensation for mistrust, which is more eﬀective
for severe illnesses.25 Altogether, in the case F another ineﬃciency in demand arises
beside a reduced demand which is a risk in gross-income and therefore, net-income. An
equation of marginal utility is impossible in this case. This kind of risk is also relevant to
 F. However, as already mentioned, a demand  qsf is basically eﬃcient because it exactly
matches the demand which is calculated by the ﬁrst order condition and is supplied ex-
post independently of an subjective adjustment downwards.
Restricted quality  < 1
Second, connected to the ﬁrst point and through the assumption of a maximum quality
abroad qmax
f =   qh, a restricted demand intensiﬁes the inequality of gross- and net-incomes
across low health stages which is valid for both, F and  F. Furthermore, for  < 1 and
a maximum demand  q
sf < q
sh in the optimum the objective (not only the perceived)
achievable quality is ineﬃcient compared to the home country.
Monetary transaction costs
Third, variable transaction-costs reduce the ex-post demand below the level at home and
 F. Lump-sum costs T increase Rf and it reduce the net-income. Especially for high levels
of Hs and therefore low levels of q
sf, T is proportionately high measured on the total costs
of cf(q
sf) + ms + ns + T. If there were a utility gain based on saving variable treatment
costs, T could compensate this advantage. Only at a lower level Hs, the proportion of
T is reduced in the total costs and the total cost-saving. In other words, for a common
cold, the ﬂight ticket compensates the total savings due to a comparably low potential for
savings, however, for cardiac surgery, the ticket has the same price but loses in importance.
Non-monetary transaction costs
Fourth, the non-monetary transaction-costs have to be covered by the patient alone. The
characteristic of equal net-incomes for every health status is not fulﬁlled. Thus, costs
connected to psychological discomfort as a speciﬁc characteristic of medical treatment is
an important factor for ineﬃciency through a reduced demand and an induced risk which
decreases the expected utility.
Again, this is not valid for  F due to t = 0. Hence, in this case, no income risk exists
on the side of costs due to the possibility of the full coverage of the marginal treatment
costs. However, as described above, the diﬀerences between a perceived and a factual risk
must receive attention.
Finally, the issue of eﬀective costs arises, which can be separated into two sub-issues.
First, how do costs behave within the foreign country, and, second, how does that work
between both countries?
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25A simpliﬁed comparison can be made with a demand for a four-star-hotel abroad whereas the con-
sumer demands a ﬁve-star-hotel to be on the safe side. In the case of very low trust a six- or seven-star-






sf as expected costs, whereas q
 F
sf is calculated by condition (24) with marginal
costs of 
 and the mistrust parameter  . Then, the costs for the case F with mistrust
only ( <  ) and t = 0 are csf(q
F











as the necessary condition for q
F
sf . Then assume H
 F
f <  H. Because of mistrust 
it is not possible in general for a given 





sf 8Hs and E(c
 F
f ) > E(c
F
f ). However, the average costs per eﬀec-















;)). This means, that the marginal costs abroad are adjusted up-
wards above the real variable costs per quality unit based on the mistrust bias in demand.
This adjustment takes place in the case  F and F, but only     is the source of the ad-
justment which represents an ineﬃciency. The point here is, that the individual pays for
demand q
F
sf , anticipates however, only a lower amount of quality. That is the reason for
the adjustment of quality demand downwards in consequence of higher eﬀective marginal











sf )) = 
sf which is the bias between the net-income
under „eﬃcient mistrust“ and „ineﬃcient mistrust“ abroad. This kind of transaction-costs
can also be deﬁned as costs used in the framework of institutional economics whereby a
lack of information cause a reduction in individual activities. In other words, this eﬀect
is suﬃcient for a second best solution abroad compared to a solution with   = .
The second question discusses the cost relation between the two countries. Again, the
average costs of an eﬀective quality unit shall be discussed. At home, they are ACh = 1
and abroad, ACf = (MCfq
sf(MCf;) + T)=(q
sf(MCf;)). For MCf < 1 the relation
between ACh and ACf depends on the bias of the quality and therefore speciﬁcally on the
relation between MCf and .26 In principle, the same conclusion as before can be drawn.
A bias between both countries causes higher average costs based on an adjustment of
marginal costs upwards, which produces further costs of mistrust. Finally, a compensa-
tion of a price-advantage 
 < 1 takes place.27 Furthermore, the ﬁxed transaction costs
T increase the average costs and can reduce the net-income below the net-income at home.
A ﬁrst result can be derived according to the eﬃciency of a foreign demand. Despite
a demand along marginal costs in F, the demand is biased and reduced compared to a
solution at home. Furthermore, the income risk cannot be totally eliminated. Compared
to  F as a benchmark abroad the solution under F can only be second best in its best
compared to  F where  is in its maximum and transaction-costs are zero.
So far, the dimensions of ex-post demand and income risk have been focused on. Final
conclusions about an improvement of expected utility abroad were not drawn. However,
the previous ﬁndings are important for exactly this discussion in the next chapter.
26For MCf =  and T = 0 identical average costs with identical net incomes are produced.
27In this context, Rauch (1999) postulates a decreasing success of matching when the degree of diﬀer-
entiation of a traded good increases. A trusty environment would be necessary to compensate this. This
can also be translated into an adjustment of marginal costs based on a lack in trust, especially, when the
health stage decreases and the portfolio of treatments expands.
155 The choice between home and foreign treatment
In this chapter, an improvement of the expected utility through the choice of the foreign
option is analyzed with (9) < (17):
S X
s=1
sUsh [Ysh   Rh   qsh + Ash] <
S X
s=1
sUsf [Ysf   Rf   
qsf + Asf   t(qsf)] (27)
At ﬁrst, a possible improvement of ex-post utility must be investigated, given a speciﬁc
health stage without a possibility of insurance coverage. Hence, the net-incomes have to
be compared with ysh < ysf as a condition for a choice of the foreign option.
The demand abroad is given with Y 0
sf = 
+m0+n0. As can be seen, Y 0
sh = Y 0
sf = 1 is
valid for    m0   n0 = 
. Hence, an increasing demand abroad compared to a treatment
at home is necessary for  q
sf = q
sh (due to Hs+q
sf) for which the marginal costs abroad
must decrease to    m0   n0 = 
. Then the same ex-post health status is achievable
in both countries and equal gross-incomes at home and abroad must follow. In addition,
due to q
sf = q
sh and    m0   n0 = 




sf = cf(qsf) and then also the net-income with ysh = ysf.28 The
former discussion is also valid for  Fs with   = 
 as indiﬀerence condition.
q
sf increases above the indiﬀerence level for every health stage (or the perceived level
 q
sf = q
sh) as long 
=(   m0   n0) < 1 (for  Fs: 
=  < 1) and the maximum  H is still
not achieved. In addition, an extension of demand for high health stages, for which no
demand occurs at home, becomes possible. However, in a case in which  H is already
achieved at home with  q
sh as demand, the situation changes. Let us assume  q
sh is exactly
the optimal demand for marginal costs of 1 at home. The perceived gross-income abroad
must be below the gross-income at home with a maximum of Ysf(Hs +  qsf) (for  Fs:
Ysf(Hs +   qsf)). An increase of q
sf above  q
sh is not possible anymore for all s with a
perceived quality  q
sf. To achieve a higher net-income abroad, the level of 
 must be
suﬃciently low to compensate the diﬀerence of gross-incomes.
In the case of 
=(   m0   n0) > 1 (for  Fs: 
=  > 1) and H
h <  H, as the cost-
advantage is too low or the mistrust too high, q
sf decreases below the indiﬀerence level
based on an adjustment of marginal-costs upwards above the level at home.
At this point a link to the average costs makes sense. ACsf = (MCfq
sf(MCf;) +
T)=(q
sf(MCf;)) < 1 = ACsh is necessary for an increasing utility abroad given a















;)). Hence, we can also derive a conclusion about a ranking of preferable
options of treatment location. For 
=  < 1 the option abroad with   is utility maximizing
and ﬁnally ﬁrst best. But where does Fs have to be? From the relation of average costs
it could be derived that F can only be second best in its best compared to  Fs with
Fhs < Fs <  Fs when ACh > ACf(). Then the foreign option is utility maximizing
and the solution at home is third best. However, a third best solution is also possi-
ble abroad in a case in which the constellation of marginal costs and mistrust as well as
28In principle this result is also valid for a quadratic cost-function, whereby the necessary 
 must
decrease below    m0   n0 = 
 for an indiﬀerence.
16transaction-costs as before are not fulﬁlled either with Fs < Fhs <  Fs or Fs <  Fs < Fhs.
After the discussion of the general condition for a utility improvement ex-post, we need




sf = T +m(q
sf)+
q
sf to check for a possible improvement of the expected utility.












sh < Ysf(Hs + q

sf)   Ysh(Hs + q

sh) (28)
Condition (28) can be interpreted as an economic border, whose shift depends on the





































The term on the left in the brackets is strictly negative for an optimal demand when all
the elements of the marginal costs are positive (see condition (23)). A rising 
 reduces
the income Ysf and decreases the non-monetary transaction-costs due to reduced demand.
The middle term describes the reduction of the insurance rate based on the demand ef-
fect. The contribution for Usf(ysf) is positive in terms of marginal treatment costs and
monetary transaction-costs. The ﬁrst two terms are in sum negative due to uncertainty.
The term on the right has a negative impact on the expected utility and represents the
price eﬀect. Hence, an increasing 
 reduces the expected net-income and the expected
utility abroad.
We already know that for a possible choice of a foreign country 
=(   m0   n0) < 1
is necessary. In addition, let us assume  = 1 and  <  . Rf is positive and T shall
be zero. Furthermore, the optimal demand at home shall be Yh(H) < Y (  H). Due to
MCh = 1, Rh is also positive. To know whether condition (28) is satisﬁed for all Hs one
must distinguish between the diﬀerent levels of health. The described assumptions can
be summarized as follows:
(MCf > 0 ^ T = 0)  (Rf1 > 0);  <  ;  = 1; Y

h (H











s  [Y mid





s  [Y low
sf (Hs +   qsf) < Y mid
sf ] ! (ylow
sf1 < ylow
sh )
As can be seen, the fulﬁllment of (27) depends on the health level and its risk. If
the emphasis on risk lies on high levels Hhigh
s , the foreign option would be preferable
17given MCf.29 However, the following has to be taken into consideration. Compared
to a solution at home, full insurance coverage abroad is not possible as shown in (26)
based on non-monetary costs n(qsf). Hence, due to uncertainty abroad, there is no ex-
ante indiﬀerence but a strict preference for the home option for 
=(   m0   n0) = 1.
Therefore, 
=(  m0 n0) < 1 is necessary but not suﬃciently. 
 must be suﬃciently low
to compensate this element of uncertainty abroad.
In a case in which the emphasis is on middle health stages Hmid
s , a situation is imagin-
able in which the perceived income can only achieve a level below Ysf(q
sf) due to mistrust
and the connected adjustment of demand. However, (28) can still be fulﬁlled despite
Ysh(H) > Ysf(H).30 This depends on the marginal costs at home and on the strength
of income, adjustment abroad through mistrust and quality restriction. For a suﬃciently
low 
 the gross-income deﬁcit abroad could then be compensated by a cost-advantage.
Furthermore, 
 must also be suﬃciently low to compensate an arising risk on the side
of gross-income due to a maximum demand  qsf8Hmid
s and a connected decrease in the
perceived gross-income for decreasing health stages. Altogether, also for Hmid
s an im-
provement of the expected utility could arise.
For an emphasis of risk on Hlow
s the income abroad is too low for satisfying (28).
Despite an extreme case of 
 = 0 the gross-income deﬁcit could be too high for being
compensated by a costs advantage.31
The higher the illness severity the higher the value of income risk based on the income
risk on the gross-income side as well as on the cost side or n, respectively. In conclusion

 must decrease a fortiori when the risk for suboptimal health stages increases. This may
be a bit confusing as someone can think that lower health stages improve the situation
due to higher potential savings measured on the product of marginal costs diﬀerences
and the number of demanded units. If someone thinks about a common cold or a bypass
operation the latter would save more costs in terms of the total number of demanded
units of quality and T becomes less important. Hence, low health stages generate a
speciﬁc advantage in terms of these costs.32 However, mistrust and non-monetary costs
worsen this advantage due to a remaining risk. Therefore, individuals with a relatively
high probability of suﬀering a severe illness and a low probability of remaining healthy
29To prove that Hhigh
s is not a null set under speciﬁc conditions we ﬁrstly know that (Y 0




sf) ^ (Y 
sh > Y 
sf)) is valid. For q
sh > q
sf and Y 
sh > Y 
sf,  < 
 < 1 exists. Then 0 <  =

 < 
 < 1 must exist, with Y 0
sh = Y 0
sf when Y 
sh = Y 
sf shall be fulﬁlled, whereby q
sf > q
sh due
to adjustment of demand in Ysf(Hs + qsf) based on . However, this can only be fulﬁlled as long as
Y 
sf < Ysh(  H) and q
sf <  qsf. Then 
 must decrease below  (
 = 0 in case 1) for Hhigh
s with  qsf as
a set with a positive number of elements. For a decreasing Hs, represented as Hmid
s , also  qsf(
 = 0) is
demanded. However, in this case Hs decreases as a lower bound in Yf(Hs +qsf) whereby the necessary
demand q
sf is not achievable due to q
sf >  qsf (despite  = 1). Then Ysf decreases below the level Y 
sh.
30If a quality diﬀerence was a source of utility reduction beside the reduction of income a utility
improvement in such a constellation would not necessarily take place.
31Hall et al. (2001) postulate trust as an essential element for severe illnesses which is derived from
a larger degree of vulnerability. In addition, patients are more willing to enter a paternalistic relation
due to a high degree of powerlessness. This is quite compatible with my results. The patient makes an
ex-ante decision whereby the existing mistrust in terms of a treatment abroad has a higher impact for
severe illnesses. This induces a decision in aid of the provider at home, who is more trustworthy.
32For a concave structure of variable transaction-costs, a relative advantage (per unit) for low health
stages would be produced whereby a convex structure would generate the opposite.
18would prefer a treatment solution at home and vice versa. This means also that a possible
compensation for immaterial damage would be an incentive to demand abroad which is,
however, diﬃcult to quantify and therefore excluded in the model.
Connected to this point, as was already seen when the average costs were discussed,
T implemented in Rf has the highest weight for high health stages and decreases in its
relative value for lower stages. Therefore, higher health stages degrade due to ﬁxed costs
and low stages due to mistrust.
Altogether, an improvement of the total expected utility over all three health stages is
possible when 
=( m0 n0) < 1 complies with the necessary compensation of transaction-
costs, deﬁcits in gross-income, mistrust and income-risk. Then, for a fulﬁllment of (27),
F a second best solution would be between ﬁrst best  F and third best of Fh.
 < 1 worsens the foreign option at every stage due to a lower achievable income, espe-
cially for lower health stages. However, a reduced income Y 
h (H) improves the situation
of a treatment option abroad for all Hs. For Y 
h (  H), all stages have a lower gross-income
abroad whereby the basic result remains unchanged with an intensiﬁed situation for the
foreign country. Finally, a decreasing parameter  shifts the borders among the three
separate health levels. This means that the set of income relations for low health stages
increases and decreases for high stages, which worsens the total result of the foreign option.
So far, a strict division into a tariﬀ at home or abroad was assumed. Based on the
previous results, a mixed insurance tariﬀ can be conceivable. High health stages should
only be treated abroad when ﬁxed costs are low whereas low stages are treated at home.
As was shown, the degree of such a distribution of treatment locations depends on the
level of marginal costs abroad. Hence, the stages in the middle are more predestined
for treatment abroad despite a reduced ex-post health stage. Such a mix maximizes the
expected utility. In this context, the subject of selective contracts shall be discussed
brieﬂy. This is speciﬁcally relevant for a provider contracting forced by the insurance. If
the expected utility of the insurant is in the focus of the insurer, the insurer must orient
himself toward contracting with speciﬁc countries that have suﬃcient cost advantages and
a positive inﬂuence on the trust the individual would have to muster up.
Another remark is the following. It is thinkable that an insurance contract is not pro-
vided for a foreign provision. Then, the individual has to choose between a full provision
at home with a total elimination of risk or a mixed contract whereby particular treat-
ments (e. g. low health stages) are insured at home and others are treated abroad without
insurance. The latter option must generate a higher expected utility for choosing such a
mix. In principle, the same suﬃcient condition as above must be fulﬁlled. The individ-
ual substitute treatments at home through medical services abroad for which a necessary
cost-advantage exists that is suﬃcient for a compensation of transaction-costs, income
risk, and losses in gross-income. Here, this risk is not only produced by non-monetary
transaction-costs and diﬀerences in gross-income as above but also by monetary as well
as medical treatment costs, which are also diﬀerent at every health stage.
Furthermore, let us relax the assumptions of 
  1 and   1. In principle, four
cases can be diﬀerentiated, whereby the ﬁrst one was discussed above with the given as-
19sumptions. A second case is 
 > 0 and   1. This means that quality abroad is still
restricted, but the marginal treatment costs can be higher than at home. This case is
easy to solve due to 
 < 1 remains necessary for a utility improvement. The third case is

  1 and  > 0. Here, a cost and quality advantage exists abroad which implies  qh not
as the maximum for Hs = 0. Then, a situation is possible in which 
 is low enough to
generate a perceived quality and gross-income above the level at home. This constellation
improves the total position of the foreign country.33 The fourth case is the most general
one with 
 > 0 and  > 0. For 
 > 1,  > 1 has no eﬀect in terms of an improvement
of a foreign treatment due to a demand in the optimum, which is below the demand at
home.34 Therefore, only case three with 
  1 and  > 0 improves the foreign option due
to the weakening of restrictions in demand discussed above.
Finally, diﬀering to the deﬁnition of medical goods as local assurance goods, f > 1
could mean an over-assessment of the foreign quality whereby the objective productivity
abroad and  shall be one. Then, based on 
=(  m0  n0) = 1, MCf can be higher than
MCh to achieve a perceived indiﬀerence. Contrary to f < 1 the optimal demand is too
high. Furthermore, lower health stages have an advantage. The lower Hs the more the
demand is adjusted downwards relative to higher Hs due to qsff. Compared to f < 1 a
perceived uncertainty in gross-income can never arise due to the fact that an upper quality
bound does not come into eﬀect. However, due to an adjustment of quality upwards,  qsf
(or higher quality levels, in general) would not be demanded in a case in which  H
f is the
optimal ex-post health. Then, the perceived uncertainty in the case f < 1 changes into
a factual uncertainty due to the adjusted demand downwards, which is also valid for all
otherH
sf. However, ex-ante this inequality the individual does not have in mind.
6 Fixed insurance tariﬀ and ex-post choice
Co-payment insurance
In this chapter, the ex-post demand shall be discussed, in which the insurance tariﬀ is
already ﬁxed. The patient only has an insurance contract for treatments at home because
the foreign option was not available when the contract was signed. Furthermore, the
contract is not reimbursed by a lump-sum, but the patient has to make a co-payment
h. Then, a further source of ineﬃciency exists, namely an ex-post moral hazard.35 The
question is whether there is a utility improvement possible if a foreign treatment is possible
at once ex-post given a speciﬁc health status Hs:
[Ysh(Hs + qh)   Rh   hqsh] < [Ysf(Hs + qsf)   Rh   h
qsf   t(qsf)]
or
[Ysf   Ysh] > [h(
qsf   qsh) + t(qsf)] (31)
33It could be discussed whether pragmatic mistrust according to a foreign country with a higher quality
than at home is a feasible assumption.
34However, 
 > 1 may be possible, when  H is achieved with MCh = 1.
35For a basic discussion of the moral hazard and treatment abroad see Mattoo/Rathindran (2005).
20The co-payment rate is given through the insurance rate at home and shall also be valid
for a possible demand abroad. Then, the diﬀerence of gross-incomes as in (31) on the
left hand side must be higher than the diﬀerence of costs paid abroad and at home. The
optimal demand abroad is given similar to (23) with:
@Uf(~ ysf)
@qsf






 is a co-payment for monetary transaction-costs (also for T). Only 
 can be changed
perhaps through the choice of a country where treatment can be demanded. The derivative























or 0 > hqsf (33)
Condition (33) means that for a rising 
 the change of the gross-income is higher than the
change of costs in a marginal consideration. For a decreasing 
 the net-income abroad
increases compared to the net-income at home (hqsf < 0). Under consideration of
quality constraints abroad, variable transaction-costs, and the mistrust bias, a country
with a suﬃciently low 
 can (not necessary) produce a preference for a treatment abroad
in a marginal consideration. The ﬁxed transaction-costs must be attended to as well,
which becomes less important when the demand and therefore the total costs increase.
Similar to the solution within the former chapter, 
 must not increase about a max-
imum level. The optimal demand at home is calculated by Y 0
h = h. Similar to the
case above, Y 0
f must be equal to h. From (32) follows for the maximum of 
: 
max =
   (m0 + n0)=h which generates an indiﬀerence in gross-incomes. Due to the ﬁxed
insurance rate only the variable co-payments are relevant, which shall be equal at home
and abroad. Hence, the net-incomes are equal as well. Therefore, 
 must decrease below

max whereas the marginal eﬀect in (33) shows an increase in utility.
Condition (31) is written for the patient. But what is the condition for the insurance





The eﬀective quality abroad shall be equal to the demanded quality at home which is
the benchmark health level ex-post for the insurance. Then, 
max = (h)=f (t = 0) is
necessary to fulﬁll this condition, whereas with f a separation of co-payments between
both countries is installed. Then the marginal costs abroad 
(f) must be low enough to
achieve qsh. Hence, a situation can occur in which 
 < 
max, so that f > h whereby
(34) still remains. Beside the still relevant mistrust bias, the degree of ex-post moral haz-
ard abroad could be reduced compared to the home country and the costs advantage can
also be achieved. However, the amount of costs savings must be shared with the patient
to fulﬁll (31), which must be carried out as a lump-sum reimbursement.
If transaction-costs are included, 
 must decrease to 
max = (h   m0   n0)=f. The
co-payment  for m(qsf) + T can be orientated toward a level at which (31) can be ful-
ﬁlled. However, to fulﬁll (34) and to carry out an advantage in total costs, 
 < 
max is
21necessary to compensate (1   )(m(qsf) + T) and to produce further cost savings which
can be shared with the patient. Non-monetary costs n must not be too high because this
amount cannot be covered except only indirectly through covering m and T. In principle,
the reduction of the moral hazard is also possible in this case.
Full insurance coverage
The full coverage of treatment costs at home, e. g. in a context of a social security system,
in which the duty exists to pay a deﬁned premium, is a borderline case. Then, condition
(31) cannot be fulﬁlled. h = 0 and therefore the right-hand side of the inequation can be
at minimum zero or positive for t > 0. The left-hand side however is negative due to an
achieved maximum of demand at home. This can also be seen in 
max = (h m0 n0)=f
which cannot be fulﬁlled independently on the level of f and 
. Therefore, the patient
actually has no incentive to choose the foreign country, which is also valid for f = 0. A
full coverage reduces the sensitivity over a costs advantage abroad. Then, only a higher
quality abroad could induce foreign demand.
However, the insurance is interested in a foreign treatment as long as, 
 < 1 and a ful-
ﬁlled condition (34). Similar to the case before, a lump-sum reimbursement is possible to
induce demand and to achieve the cost advantage. However, despite condition (31) could
then be fulﬁlled, the patient urgently lose in terms of the health stage after treatment
and gross-income.
No insurance coverage
Here, we can separate into a case in which f =  = 1 and f = h =  = 1. For the
ﬁrst 
 must achieve the level 
max = h   (m0 + n0) for a fulﬁllment of (31). In the
latter 
max =    (m0 + n0) must be fulﬁlled as in the discussion in the previous chapter.
Furthermore, for both cases the ﬁxed costs T must be considered in the calculation.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
The paper provides a contribution to the debate about cross-border medical care and its
advantageousness. The analysis shows that a treatment abroad can be utility-maximizing,
however, only second best in its best compared to a solution with mistrust as a preference.
An insurance tariﬀ with mixed locations is thereby utility-maximizing. The demand op-
tion abroad is connected with a biased and reduced demand as well as an income risk on
the cost and gross-income side. Mistrust plays a signiﬁcant role. It generates an upward
adjustment of marginal costs whereby costs of mistrust can be caluculated. A necessary
condition can be derived for utility improvement. The marginal treatment costs abroad
must fall short of a threshold level to compensate transaction-costs, income losses, and
induced income risk. There is also a relative advantage for higher health stages, however,
alleviated through ﬁxed transaction-costs. Low stages are less capable to generate foreign
demand despite higher cost savings potential due to an increasing impact of mistrust and
a restricted quality.
Furthermore, higher quality and lower costs abroad lead to a migration along a qual-
22ity gradient. Furthermore, in a case in which the foreign quality is overrated, ineﬃcient
demand takes place as well, however, without a perceived uncertainty in gross-incomes.
At last, co-payment is discussed with an insurance objective of a cross-border equal-
ization of demand. A reduction of the moral hazard through an adjusted co-payment is
possible. Then, cost savings can be realized which, however, must be shared with the
patient. Transaction-costs must be compensated by an increasing saving potential. A full
insurance at home reduces but does not eliminate the incentive of demand abroad due
to a reduced sensitivity over foreign costs whereby a gain of gross-income is, however,
impossible. If there is no insurance coverage at home and abroad, the critical levels of
marginal and ﬁxed costs are of interest to induce demand abroad.
What are the consequences for a health policy to achieve a foreign cost advantage?
Mistrust over the quality abroad plays a vital role. An important issue must be targeted
for its empirical relevance and inﬂuenceable determinants. If mistrust is a pure prefer-
ence, an immediate eﬃciency problem would not exist but the potential of cross-border
medical care would be restricted nonetheless due to a general reduction in demand. If
mistrust is based on a general lack of information, the question follows how these deﬁcits
can be reduced. Greif (1993), Rauch (1999, 2002), Guiso et al. (2009) discuss cross-border
networks and the aﬃnity of trading partners as important instruments for improving the
eﬃciency of trust in trade relations. Hospital networks and transferred standards to hos-
pitals abroad could enlarge the familiar care of a health care system at home to a foreign
country. For example, U.S. hospitals such as Harvard or John-Hopkins arrange network
contracts with hospitals abroad. Schroth and Khawaja (2007) discuss the necessity of
validating quality in the form of accreditation as it is done e. g. by the Joint Commission
International who set quality standards in the U.S. but also has accredited a number of
foreign medical providers. As derived from Rauch (1999), a higher degree of standardis-
ation through a certiﬁcation of speciﬁc treatments could reduce the importance of trust.
Furthermore, the literature identiﬁes reputation and experience as central determinants
of trust. Hence, if the implementation of a foreign treatment option shall come into real
focus, a process over a speciﬁc period of familiarization between patients and providers
is necessary, whose success will depend on the numerous further characteristics of the
target country and the individuals involved. The instrument of a separate insurance tariﬀ
connected to a free choice of preferable providers at home and abroad could stimulate the
use of a foreign provider despite existing sources of ineﬃciency. Last but not least, the
eﬀort connected with an improvement of trust in a foreign system must be investigated
to give a ﬁnal answer about the eﬃciency of such measures.
A restricted maximum quality is motivated by the existence of the diﬀerently devel-
oped health care systems in the world. Hence, a network of developed countries could also
be necessary, e.g. within systems as EU, NAFTA or others due to their integrated charac-
ter and the instruments used in bilateral agreements (Calnan et al. (1997), France (1997),
Starmans et al. (1997)). Such cross-border agreements support the integration of mar-
kets and reduce the ineﬃciencies discussed above, especially in regions with neighbourly
relations.
The integration of transaction-costs m and n is typical for trade, also or even more in
23medical services. Can these costs be reduced below a prohibitive level through a better
integration of international health care markets? The organization, travelling and inter-
faces between the diﬀerent stages of treatment at home and abroad are important sources
for such costs. Attention has to be paid to non-monetary transaction-costs, which are
speciﬁc for the demand for medical services abroad. These costs are closely connected to
the speciﬁc character of a treatment. They are also a parameter for mobility, especially
connected to diﬀerent kinds of illnesses whereby not all of them are eligible for interna-
tional trade. Mostly, these costs are responsible for a restricted trade in health care due
to a prohibitive level. A payment of compensation for immaterial damages could be an
instrument for an inducement of demand.
Of course the discussion is incomplete. A number of questions are still open such as
the integration of the supply side with a speciﬁc form of competition and cross-border
hospital choice. Furthermore, a competitive advantage in the case of the integration of
foreign suppliers through speciﬁc contracts with a foreign supplier is of speciﬁc interest.
Another important point in this context is the matching process of patients, hospitals
and insurance under the discussed ineﬃciencies. Furthermore, it was assumed that a cost
advantage can compensate quality deﬁcits. However, the assumption of a lexicographical
conﬁguration of preferences is imaginable whereby the foreign quality must at least be
identical with the quality at home. Furthermore, the legal resources abroad are also an
important element. As Cortez (2009) shows, U.S. patients are often not able to appraise
the legal risks abroad but also at home. Furthermore, it is often a show of strength to be-
come compensated when malpractice take place abroad and at home. These things could
have an important inﬂuence as a speciﬁc risk. Another important point is the insurance
itself for which a foreign option is currently not given in most cases. The reason is also
based on a kind of trust and the unobservability of the foreign quality.
The potential to carry out a comparative advantage abroad is bounded as long as the
assumptions made play a signiﬁcant role. As a result, cross-border care is mainly possible
- if at all - between countries with a high degree of proximity. The discussed assumptions
have a relatively obvious impact. However, to underline these is an important point in
the context of an internationalization process of health care. Today, this process is in its
infancy. Hence it is important to discuss the general possibilities and trade limitations in
health services. Firstly, it is important to begin a theoretical discussion not only due to
the unavailability of data but also for the creation of a general analytical framework with
a connection to health and international economics.
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